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CASE DIGEST
By DREW POMERANCE

*

The materials in this section are intended to provide a concise
overview of the United States case law relating to computer crime.'
Each case is summarized in a separate digest entry. Each entry
contains the following information:
* case name
* case citation
* subsequent history (if any)
* summary of salient facts
* legal analysis and holding of the court
The digest entries are organized alphabetically.
CR1

Hancock v. Decker, 379 F.2d 552, 1 CLSR 858 (5th Cir. 1967)

This was an appeal from the denial of a petition for habeas
corpus. The defendant contended that he was unlawfully convicted
of theft, in that the corporeal personal property that he was accused
of taking did not have a value in excess of $50.00 as required by
Texas law. 2 In affirming the denial, the court found that there "was
defendant] committed the offense for
ample evidence that [the
3
indicted."
was
he
which
CR2

Hancock v. State, 402 S.W.2d 906, 1 CLSR 562 (Crim. App.
1966).

The indictment alleged theft of fifty-nine documents, which consisted of computer programs. The defendants were an employee of
Texas Instruments and an employee of an insurance company. The
defendants took the listings of these programs and attempted to sell
* B.A. Political Science, University of California at Berkeley. Mr. Pomerance is
currently a third-year student at Hastings College of the Law, San Francisco, California.
1. Only cases focusing on the crimes themselves are covered. Not included are
computer crime cases where the question before the court was merely one concerning the admissibility of evidence or other collateral issue.
2. 379 F.2d at 552, 1 CLSR at 858.
3. Id. at 553, 1 CLSR at 859.
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them to Texaco. Texaco contacted Texas Instruments, and the defendants were arrested.
The issue presented to the court was whether the computer programs constituted corporeal personal property as that term is used
in the Texas theft statute. The statute defines "property" to include,
inter alia, "all writings of every description, provided such property
possesses any ascertainable value."' 4 The testimony indicated that
the programs had a reasonable market value of approximately $2.5
million. The court found that the programs were property within
5
the meaning of the statute.
The defendants also challenged their conviction on the ground
that there was no evidence showing the market value of the computer programs. The court quoted a large portion of the testimony
of a vice-president of Texas Instruments, and the manager of the
computer center at Texas Instruments, 6 and found that this evidence was sufficient to authorize a finding that the'7computer programs had a market value "in excess of $50.00 each."
CR3

United States v. Curtis, 537 F.2d 1091, 6 CLSR 1402 (10th Cir.
1976).

The defendant was convicted of mail fraud. 8 Defendant's
scheme was a purported computerized dating service. In fact, the
matching was accomplished manually by untrained clerical workers
or by the defendant himself. The court held that there was substantial evidence in the record to establish the elements of the offense
as charged, and upheld the conviction.
CR4

United States v. Jones, 414 F. Supp. 964, 6 CLSR 197, rev'd, 553
F.2d 351, 6 CLSR 209 (4th Cir. 1977).

Defendant Jones was charged with transportation of stolen, converted, or fraudulently obtained securities and with receiving, selling or disposing of those securities knowing them to have been
stolen, converted or taken by fraud. 9 The securities at issue were
five checks, made payable to the order of "A.L.E. Jones," and drawn
on a Canadian bank against the account of a Canadian firm. The
government alleged that the defendant transported the checks from
Canada to Maryland and deposited the checks in a Maryland bank
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

402 S.W. 2d at 908, 1 CLSR at 865.
Id.
Id. at 909-11, 1 CLSR at 567-69.
Id. at 911, 1 CLSR at 569.
18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1976).
Id. §§ 2314, 2315.
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account. The dispute revolved around the question of whether or
not the securities, i.e., the checks, were genuine, or instead were forgeries of checks of a foreign corporation to which federal law does
not apply. 10
The difficulty that the trial court had with the issue arose because the checks were printed by computer, complete with authorized facsimile signatures, and were printed as a direct result of
tampering with the data stored in the computer and with the payment data input to the computer. The question facing the judge was
whether these checks could be characterized as "falsely made,
forged, altered, counterfeited or spurious."
The judge held that "the mere fact that a computer was used to
print these checks should not be permitted to confuse the matter.""
The judge found that the computer merely acted as an extension of
the defendant's accomplice and that the checks therefore fit within
the definition of forgery. 12 Since the court found that the crime was
forgery, the acts did not come within the proscription of federal law
and the indictments were dismissed.
On appeal, the court held that instead of forgery, the crime was
fraud or false pretenses. In making that ruling, the court made the
following distinction:
We think, however, that the acts of [defendant's accomplice] did
not constitute the making of a false writing, but rather amounted to
the creation of a writing which was genuine in execution but false
The distincas to the statements of facts contained in such writing.
13
tion is critical to the sufficiency of the indictment.
The court found that the Canadian firm's accounting department was defrauded into believing that the company owed a bona
fide obligation to defendant Jones, and, accordingly, issued a "genuine instrument containing a false statemept of fact as to the true
14
Since the check did not fall within the forgery exclusion
creditor."'
of the statutes, the court reversed the district court and reinstated
5
the indictment.'
10. Section 2314 provides in pertinent part:
This section shall not apply to any falsely made, forged, altered, counterfeited or spurious representation of an obligation or other security. . . issued
by any foreign government or by a bank or corporation of any foreign country.
Id. § 2314.
11. 414 F. Supp. at 969, 6 CLSR at 205.
12. Id. at 969, 6 CLSR at 205-06.
13. 553 F.2d at 355, 6 CLSR at 214 (emphasis in original).
14. Id. at 355, 6 CLSR at 215 (emphasis in original).
15. Id. at 356, 6 CLSR at 217.
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United States v. Lambert, 446 F. Supp. 890 (D. Conn. 1978).

The defendants were charged with selling information obtained
from the Drug Enforcement Administration pertaining to the identity of possible informants and the status of drug traffic investigations. Defendant was indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 641.16 On
defendant's motion to dismiss, the court held that: (1) the statute is
not restricted to the theft of tangible property, but the phrase
"'thing of value,' in conjunction with the explicit reference to 'any
record,' covers the context of such a record"17; (2) the statute is not
unconstitutionally vague and "an individual planning the unauthorized sale of information held in a government data bank had sufficient notice that such conduct would be covered by § 641;'18; and (3)
the statute is not facially invalid for overbreadth, since a narrow interpretation is possible which avoids deterring constitutionally protected speech. 19
CR6

United States v. Sampson, 6 CLSR 879 (N.D. Cal. 1978).

Sampson, a former employee of the Institute for Advanced
Computation, Inc. ("IAC"), a NASA contractor, and Miller, an employee of IAC, obtained unauthorized use of a United States government computer without the intent to reimburse the government for
such use. Sampson used one of his home telephones to gain access
to the computer, using the code name "Captain Libra." A NASA investigator discovered from computer printouts that a person using
the name "Captain Libra" had used the computer. The investigator
then confronted Sampson and Miller with the printouts, whereupon
both admitted that these printouts reflected portions of their unauthorized use of the computer. Based upon Sampson's statement
that he used the computer for an average of six hours per week for
thirty-two weeks, a value of $1,924.00 was calculated for the commercial cost of Sampson's computer utilization.
Both Sampson and Miller were indicted for violations of 18
16. Whoever embezzles, steals, purloins, or knowingly converts to his use or
the use of another, or without authority, sells, conveys or disposes of any record, voucher, money, or thing of value of the United States or of any department or agency thereof, or any property made or being made under contract
for the United States or any department or agency thereof; of
Whoever receives, conceals, or retains the same with intent to convert it
to his use or gain, knowing it to have been embezzled, stolen, purloined, or
converted ....
18 U.S.C. § 641 (1976).
17. 446 F. Supp. at 895.
18. Id. at 896.
19. Id. at 896-900.
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U.S.C. § 641.20 Defendants moved to dismiss the indictment on the
ground that it failed to state a criminal offense, arguing that computer time and computer storage capacity were not "property"
within the meaning of the statute.
The district court denied the motions, holding that the consumption of computer time and the use of computer storage capacity were inseparable from the physical identity of the computer
itself. The court found the indictment legally sufficient, because the
computer time and the use of its storage capacities were "things of
value."
CR7

United States v. Seidlitz, 589 F.2d 152 (4th Cir. 1978).

Optimum Systems, Inc. ("OSI"), a computer service company,
was under contract to install, maintain, and operate a computer facility at Rockville, Maryland, for use by the Federal Energy Administration ("FEA"). Under the contract, persons working for FEA in
various parts of the country could use keyboards at communicatipns
terminals in their offices to send instructions over telephone circuits
to the computers in Rockville; the computers' responses would be
returned over telephone circuits and displayed on the sender's CRT
(cathode-ray tube) terminal.
Seidlitz helped to prepare the software installed at the Rockville
facility and was responsible for the security of the central computer
system. After approximately six months as Deputy Project Director
of OSI, Seidlitz resigned his job and returned to work at his own
computer firm in Alexandria, Virginia.
Approximately six months later, a computer specialist employed
by FEA, and temporarily assigned to the OSI facility, detected an
unauthorized intruder who had gained access to the computer system. It was determined that the intruder had gained access by telephone from outside the OSI facility. The telephone company was
then requested to trace the call. The telephone company manually
traced 2 ' the call to Seidlitz' Alexandria office, but would not divulge
the results of the trace except in response to a subpoena.
The following day, OSI activated a special feature of its computer system, known as the "Milten Spy Function," which automatically records any requests made of the computer by an intruder and
any computer responses to such requests. The telephone company
was again asked to trace the call when it was suspected that the un20. See note 16 srupra.
21. A manual trace entails a physical tracing of the telephone circuitry backward
through the various switching points, and does not involve listening in on the line or
breaking into the conversation.
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authorized person was using the computer. This trace lead once
again to Seidlitz' Alexandria office, though OSI was not so informed.
OSI then advised the FBI of the intrusions and, at the FBI's suggestion, the telephone company conducted two additional manual
traces when alerted by OSI. Both of these calls were terminated,
however, before the traces had progressed beyond the telephone
company's office in Lanham, Maryland, which served 10,000 subscribers. The telephone company then installed "originating accounting identification equipment" in the Lanham office. 2 2 Shortly
thereafter, two calls were made to the OSI computer and were
traced to Seidlitz' Lanham residence. The FBI then searched (with
a warrant) Seidlitz' Alexandria office, seizing, inter alia, a copy of
the user's guide to the OSI system and some forty rolls of computer
paper on which OSI source code was printed. Seidlitz' Lanham residence was also searched (with a warrant), where the officers found
a portable communications terminal which contained a teleprinter
for receiving written messages from the computer, as well as a
notebook containing access codes previously assigned to authorized
users of the OSI computers.
The indictment against Seidlitz charged him with transmitting
two telephone calls in interstate commerce as part of a scheme to
defraud OSI of property consisting of information from the com23
puter system.
Seidlitz filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized from his
office and residence, claiming that the searches had been invalidated by the use of illegal electronic surveillance to obtain the information contained in the affidavits supporting the warrants. The
district court rejected this motion ruling, inter alia, that the information obtained by use of the "Milten Spy Function" was not covered under Section 605 of the Communications Act of 193424 and that
neither Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act
of 196825 nor the fourth amendment 2 6 were violated, since the information was obtained with the consent of a party to the defendant's
telephonic communciations. The court further ruled that neither Title III nor the fourth amendment were violated during the tracing of
the telephone calls, since the number of the telephone from which
22. This equipment automatically ascertains, without interrupting any communication, the telephone number of any of the 10,000 area telephones from which any
subsequent calls to the OSI computers originated.
23. This is the federal wire fraud statute. 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1976).
24. 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1976).
25. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510 et seq. (1976).
26. U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
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the calls were placed was determined by a process which did not entail the interception of the contents of the communciations.
Over defense objections, much of the challenged evidence was
admitted at trial, and the telephone traces, as well as the operation
of the "Milten Spy Function," were described to the jury. In the face
of this evidence, Seidlitz conceded that he had retrieved the information from the computers, but claimed to have acted only out of
concern for the security of the OSI system and stated that he intended to present the printouts to OSI officials to prove to them that
their security was inadequate. Seidlitz also claimed that the
software system that he retrieved-WYLBUR-was not a trade secret or other property interest of OSI sufficient to qualify as "property" within the meaning of the wire fraud statute.27 Seidlitz was
convicted of two counts of fraud by wire.
On appeal, Seidlitz renewed his "illegal surveillance" claims and
further argued that the evidence before the jury was insufficient to
establish either his fraudulent intent or that the WYLBUR system
constituted "property." The court of appeals affirmed, holding that
(1) the use of manual telephone tracers and the "Milten Spy Function" did not constitute an invalid electronic surveillance; and (2)
there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could have found
that the WYLBUR system was "property," and that Seidlitz possessed fraudulent intent in obtaining the WYLBUR system without
authorization.
CR8

Ward v. Superior Court, 3 CLSR 206 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1972).

This is an unreported decision of a state trial court's ruling on
the defendant's demurrer and motion to strike. Defendant Ward
was an employee of University Computing Company ("UCC"), a
computer service company. Ward was charged with theft of a trade
secret belonging to ISD, another computer service company, in vio28
lation of California Penal Code sections 499C and 487.29
The trade secret was a computer program titled "Plot/Trans,"
developed by ISD and valued at $5,000. This program gave ISD a
competitive advantage over UCC and other competitors. Both the
source code 30 and object code 3 1 of the program were stored in the
27. 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1976).
28. See text accompanying note 33 infra.
29. Grand theft is theft committed in any of the following cases:
1. When the money, labor or real or personal property taken is of a
value exceeding two hundred dollars ($200); ....
CAL. PENAL CODE § 487 (West).
30. Source code (or source language) is the "original symbolic language in which
a program is prepared for processing by a computer. It is translated into object lan-
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memory of the ISD computer.
The evidence showed that on January 19, 1971, Ward dialed up
the ISD computer, furnished a customer's site and billing numbers
and secured a printout of the source code of the Plot/Trans program. Contemporaneously, the ISD computer punched out a card
deck 32 of what had been accessed, on which the time of access was
also punched. The theft was discovered when the card deck was delivered to Shell (the customer whose code numbers Ward used),
and ISD learned that Shell had not accessed the program. An investigation of telephone records revealed that the call had come from
UCC, and not Shell. A search warrant was obtained and the
printout of the program was discovered in Defendant Ward's office
at UCC.
California Penal Code § 499C(b) provides that:
Every person is guilty of theft who, with intent to deprive or withhold from the owner thereof the control of a trade secret ... does
any of the following:
1. Steals, takes or carries away any article representing a
trade secret.
3. Having unlawfully obtained access to the article, without
authority makes or causes
to be made a copy of any article repre33
senting a trade secret.
The court held that § 499C(a) requires that the "article" taken
must be tangible, even though the trade secret which the article represents may itself be intangible. Based upon the record, the court
found that the only thing that Ward "carried" from the ISD computer to the UCC computer were the electronic impulses transmitted over the telephone wires. The court held "that such impulses
are not tangible and hence do not constitute an 'article' within the
definition contained in Section 499C (a) (1) . . .,34
The court did find, however, probable cause to believe that
Ward had made a copy of the printout through the use of the UCC
computer, and thereafter carried that copy from the UCC computer
guage by an assembler or compiler." C. SIPPL, DATA COMMUNICATIONs DICTIONARY 449
(1976).
31. Object code is the " o]utput from a compiler or assembler which is itself executable machine code or is suitable for processing to produce executable machine
code." Id. at 330.
32. A card deck is "[a] set, group or 'deck' of punched cards." Id. at 39.
33. CAL. PENAL CODE § 499c(b) (West).
34. 3 CLSR at 208.
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to his office-an act forbidden by Section 499. Therefore, the court
found probable cause to believe that the offenses were committed
and that Ward had committed them, and overruled the motions.

